#### Internal fixes aren’t credible

Jack Goldsmith 13, Henry L. Shattuck Professor at Harvard Law School, May 1 2013, “How Obama Undermined the War on Terror,” <http://www.newrepublic.com/article/112964/obamas-secrecy-destroying-american-support-counterterrorism>

For official secrecy abroad to work, the secrets must be kept at home as well. In speeches, interviews, and leaks, Obama's team has tried to explain why its operations abroad are lawful and prudent. But to comply with rules of classified information and covert action, the explanations are conveyed in limited, abstract, and often awkward terms. They usually raise more questions than they answer—and secrecy rules often preclude the administration from responding to follow-up questions, criticisms, and charges. ¶ As a result, much of what the administration says about its secret war—about civilian casualties, or the validity of its legal analysis, or the quality of its internal deliberations—seems incomplete, self-serving, and ultimately non-credible. These trust-destroying tendencies are exacerbated by its persistent resistance to transparency demands from Congress, from the press, and from organizations such as the aclu that have sought to know more about the way of the knife through Freedom of Information Act requests.¶ A related sin is the Obama administration's surprising failure to secure formal congressional support. Nearly every element of Obama's secret war rests on laws—especially the congressional authorization of force (2001) and the covert action statute (1991)—designed for different tasks. The administration could have worked with Congress to update these laws, thereby forcing members of Congress to accept responsibility and take a stand, and putting the secret war on a firmer political and legal foundation. But doing so would have required extended political efforts, public argument, and the possibility that Congress might not give the president precisely what he wants.¶ The administration that embraced the way of the knife in order to lower the political costs of counterterrorism abroad found it easier to avoid political costs at home as well. But this choice deprived it of the many benefits of public argumentation and congressional support. What Donald Rumsfeld said self-critically of Bush-era unilateralism applies to Obama's unilateralism as well: it fails to "take fully into account the broader picture—the complete set of strategic considerations of a president fighting a protracted, unprecedented and unfamiliar war for which he would need sustained domestic and international support." ¶ Instead of seeking contemporary congressional support, the administration has relied mostly on government lawyers' secret interpretive extensions of the old laws to authorize new operations against new enemies in more and more countries. The administration has great self-confidence in the quality of its stealth legal judgments. But as the Bush administration learned, secret legal interpretations are invariably more persuasive within the dark circle of executive branch secrecy than when exposed to public sunlight. On issues ranging from proper targeting standards, to the legality of killing American citizens, to what counts as an "imminent" attack warranting self-defensive measures, these secret legal interpretations—so reminiscent of the Bushian sin of unilateral legalism—have been less convincing in public, further contributing to presidential mistrust.¶ Feeling the heat from these developments, President Obama promised in his recent State of the Union address "to engage with Congress to ensure not only that our targeting, detention, and prosecution of terrorists remains consistent with our laws and system of checks and balances, but that our efforts are even more transparent to the American people and to the world." So far, this promise, like similar previous ones, remains unfulfilled. ¶ The administration has floated the idea of "[shifting] the CIA's lethal targeting program to the Defense Department," as The Daily Beast reported last month. Among other potential virtues, this move might allow greater public transparency about the way of the knife to the extent that it would eliminate the covert action bar to public discussion. But JSOC's non-covert targeted killing program is no less secretive than the CIA's, and its congressional oversight is, if anything, less robust. ¶ A bigger problem with this proposed fix is that it contemplates executive branch reorganization followed, in a best-case scenario, by more executive branch speeches and testimony about what it is doing in its stealth war. The proposal fails to grapple altogether with the growing mistrust of the administration's oblique representations about secret war. The president cannot establish trust in the way of the knife through internal moves and more words. Rather, he must take advantage of the separation of powers. Military detention, military commissions, and warrantless surveillance became more legitimate and less controversial during the Bush era because adversarial branches of government assessed the president's policies before altering and then approving them. President Obama should ask Congress to do the same with the way of the knife, even if it means that secret war abroad is harder to conduct.

### Da

#### Mor ev - You cannot make linear predictions within the international system – it’s inherently volatile

Taleb & Blythe 11 – \*Distinguished Professor of Risk Engineering at New York University’s Polytechnic Institute, AND \*\*Professor of International Political Economy at Brown University (Nassim and Mark, May/June 2011, “The Black Swan of Cairo How Suppressing Volatility Makes the World Less Predictable and More Dangerous,” <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67741/nassim-nicholas-taleb-and-mark-blyth/the-black-swan-of-cairo>)

Why is surprise the permanent condition of the U.S. political and economic elite? In 2007–8, when the global ﬁnancial system imploded, the cry that no one could have seen this coming was heard everywhere, despite the existence of numerous analyses showing that a crisis was unavoidable. It is no surprise that one hears precisely the same response today regarding the current turmoil in the Middle East. The critical issue in both cases is the artiﬁcial suppres- sion of volatility—the ups and downs of life—in the name of stability. It is both mis- guided and dangerous to push unobserved risks further into the statistical tails of the probability distribution of outcomes and allow these high-impact, low-probability “tail risks” to disappear from policymakers’ ﬁelds of observation. What the world is witnessing in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya is simply what happens when highly constrained systems explode. Complex systems that have artiﬁcially suppressed volatility tend to become extremely fragile, while at the same time exhibiting no visible risks. In fact, they tend to be too calm and exhibit minimal variability as silent risks accumulate beneath the surface. Although the stated intention of political leaders and economic policymakers is to stabilize the system by inhibiting ﬂuctuations, the result tends to be the opposite. These artiﬁcially con- strained systems become prone to “Black Swans”—that is, they become extremely vulnerable to large-scale events that lie far from the statistical norm and were largely unpredictable to a given set of observers. Such environments eventually experi- ence massive blowups, catching everyone oª-guard and undoing years of stability or, in some cases, ending up far worse than they were in their initial volatile state. Indeed, the longer it takes for the blowup to occur, the worse the resulting harm in both economic and political systems. Seeking to restrict variability seems to be good policy (who does not prefer stability to chaos?), so it is with very good intentions that policymakers unwittingly increase the risk of major blowups. And it is the same misperception of the properties of natural systems that led to both the economic crisis of 2007–8 and the current turmoil in the Arab world. The policy implications are identical: to make systems robust, all risks must be visible and out in the open— ﬂuctuat nec mergitur(it ﬂuctuates but does not sink) goes the Latin saying. Just as a robust economic system is one that encourages early failures (the concepts of “fail small” and “fail fast”), the U.S. gov- ernment should stop supporting dictato- rial regimes for the sake of pseudostability and instead allow political noise to rise to the surface. Making an economy robust in the face of business swings requires allowing risk to be visible; the same is true in politics. SEDUCED BY STABILITY Both the recent ﬁnancial crisis and the current political crisis in the Middle East are grounded in the rise of complexity, interdependence, and unpredictability. Policymakers in the United Kingdom and the United States have long promoted policies aimed at eliminating ﬂuctuation— no more booms and busts in the economy, no more “Iranian surprises” in foreign policy. These policies have almost always produced undesirable outcomes. For example, the U.S. banking system became very fragile following a succession of pro- gressively larger bailouts and government interventions, particularly after the 1983 rescue of major banks (ironically, by the same Reagan administration that trum- peted free markets). In the United States, promoting these bad policies has been a bipartisan eªort throughout. Republicans have been good at fragilizing large corpora- tions through bailouts, and Democrats have been good at fragilizing the government. At the same time, the ﬁnancial system as a whole exhibited little volatility; it kept get- ting weaker while providing policymakers with the illusion of stability, illustrated most notably when Ben Bernanke, who was then a member of the Board of Gover- nors of the U.S. Federal Reserve, declared the era of “the great moderation” in 2004. Putatively independent central bankers fell into the same trap. During the 1990s, U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Alan Greenspan wanted to iron out the economic cycle’s booms and busts, and he sought to control economic swings with interest-rate reductions at the slightest sign of a downward tick in the economic data. Furthermore, he adapted his eco- nomic policy to guarantee bank rescues, with implicit promises of a backstop—the now infamous “Greenspan put.” These policies proved to have grave delayed side effects. Washington stabilized the market with bailouts and by allowing certain com- panies to grow “too big to fail.” Because policymakers believed it was better to do something than to do nothing, they felt obligated to heal the economy rather than wait and see if it healed on its own. The foreign policy equivalent is to support the incumbent no matter what. And just as banks took wild risks thanks to Greenspan’s implicit insurance policy, client governments such as Hosni Mubarak’s in Egypt for years engaged in overt plunder thanks to similarly reliable U.S. support. Those who seek to prevent volatility on the grounds that any and all bumps in the road must be avoided paradoxically increase the probability that a tail risk will cause a major explosion. Consider as a thought experiment a man placed in an artiﬁcially sterilized environment for a decade and then invited to take a ride on a crowded subway; he would be expected to die quickly. Likewise, preventing small forest ﬁres can cause larger forest ﬁres to become devastating. This property is shared by all complex systems. In the realm of economics, price con- trols are designed to constrain volatility on the grounds that stable prices are a good thing. But although these controls might work in some rare situations, the long-term effect of any such system is an eventual and extremely costly blowup whose cleanup costs can far exceed the beneﬁts accrued. The risks of a dictatorship, no matter how seemingly stable, are no diªerent, in the long run, from those of an artiﬁcially controlled price. Such attempts to institutionally engineer the world come in two types: those that conform to the world as it is and those that attempt to reform the world. The nature of humans, quite reasonably, is to in- tervene in an eªort to alter their world and the outcomes it produces. But government interventions are laden with unintended— and unforeseen—consequences, particularly in complex systems, so humans must work with nature by tolerating systems that absorb human imperfections rather than seek to change them. Take, for example, the recent celebrated documentary on the ﬁnancial crisis, Inside Job, which blames the crisis on the malfea- sance and dishonesty of bankers and the incompetence of regulators. Although it is morally satisfying, the ﬁlm naively over- looks the fact that humans have always been dishonest and regulators have always been behind the curve. The only diªerence this time around was the unprecedented magnitude of the hidden risks and a mis- understanding of the statistical properties of the system. What is needed is a system that can prevent the harm done to citizens by the dishonesty of business elites; the limited competence of forecasters, economists, and statisticians; and the imperfections of regulation, not one that aims to eliminate these ﬂaws. Humans must try to resist the illusion of control: just as foreign policy should be intelligence-proof (it should minimize its reliance on the competence of information-gathering organizations and the predictions of “experts” in what are inherently unpredictable domains), the economy should be regulator-proof, given that some regulations simply make the system itself more fragile. Due to the complexity of markets, intricate regulations simply serve to generate fees for lawyers and proﬁts for sophisticated derivatives traders who can build complicated ﬁnancial products that skirt those regulations. DON’T BE A TURKEY The life of a turkey before Thanksgiving is illustrative: the turkey is fed for 1,000 days and every day seems to conﬁrm that the farmer cares for it—until the last day, when conﬁdence is maximal. The “turkey problem” occurs when a naive analysis of stability is derived from the absence of past variations. Likewise, conﬁdence in stability was maximal at the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis in 2007. The turkey problem for humans is the result of mistaking one environment for another. Humans simultaneously inhabit two systems: the linear and the complex. The linear domain is characterized by its predictability and the low degree of interaction among its components, which allows the use of mathematical methods that make forecasts reliable. In complex systems, there is an absence of visible causal links between the elements, masking a high degree of interdependence and extremely low predictability. Nonlinear elements are also present, such as those commonly known, and generally misun- derstood, as “tipping points.” Imagine someone who keeps adding sand to a sand pile without any visible consequence, until suddenly the entire pile crumbles. It would be foolish to blame the collapse on the last grain of sand rather than the structure of the pile, but that is what people do consistently, and that is the policy error. U.S. President Barack Obama may blame an intelligence failure for the gov- ernment’s not foreseeing the revolution in Egypt (just as former U.S. President Jimmy Carter blamed an intelligence failure for his administration’s not fore- seeing the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran), but it is the suppressed risk in the statis- tical tails that matters—not the failure to see the last grain of sand. As a result of complicated interdependence and conta- gion eªects, in all man-made complex systems, a small number of possible events dominate, namely, Black Swans. Engineering, architecture, astronomy, most of physics, and much of common science are linear domains. The complex domain is the realm of the social world, epidemics, and economics. Crucially, the linear domain delivers mild variations without large shocks, whereas the complex domain delivers massive jumps and gaps. Complex systems are misunderstood, mostly because humans’ sophistication, obtained over the history of human knowl- edge in the linear domain, does not transfer properly to the complex domain. Humans can predict a solar eclipse and the trajectory of a space vessel, but not the stock market or Egyptian political events. All man-made complex systems have commonalities and even universalities. Sadly, deceptive calm (followed by Black Swan surprises) seems to be one of those properties. THE ERROR OF PREDICTION As with a crumbling sand pile, it would be foolish to attribute the collapse of a fragile bridge to the last truck that crossed it, and even more foolish to try to predict in advance which truck might bring it down. The system is responsible, not the compo- nents. But after the ﬁnancial crisis of 2007–8, many people thought that predict- ing the subprime meltdown would have helped. It would not have, since it was a symptom of the crisis, not its underlying cause. Likewise, Obama’s blaming “bad in- telligence” for his administration’s failure to predict the crisis in Egypt is symptomatic of both the misunderstanding of complex systems and the bad policies involved. Obama’s mistake illustrates the illusion of local causal chains—that is, confusing catalysts for causes and assuming that one can know which catalyst will produce which eªect. The ﬁnal episode of the upheaval in Egypt was unpredictable for all observers, especially those involved. As such, blam- ing the ciais as foolish as funding it to forecast such events. Governments are wasting billions of dollars on attempting to predict events that are produced by interdependent systems and are therefore not statistically understandable at the individual level. As Mark Abdollahian of Sentia Group, one of the contractors who sell predictive analytics to the U.S. government, noted regarding Egypt, policymakers should “think of this like Las Vegas. In blackjack, if you can do four percent better than the average, you’re making real money.” But the analogy is spurious. There is no “four percent better” on Egypt. This is not just money wasted but the construction of a false conﬁdence based on an erroneous focus. It is telling that the intelligence analysts made the same mistake as the risk-management systems that failed to predict the economic crisis—and oªered the exact same excuses when they failed. Political and economic “tail events” are unpredictable, and their probabilities are not scientiﬁcally measurable. No matter how many dollars are spent on research, predicting revolutions is not the same as counting cards; humans will never be able to turn politics into the tractable random- ness of blackjack. Most explanations being oªered for the current turmoil in the Middle East follow the “catalysts as causes” confusion. The riots in Tunisia and Egypt were initially attributed to rising commodity prices, not to stiﬂing and unpopular dictatorships. But Bahrain and Libya are countries with high gdps that can aªord to import grain and other commodities. Again, the focus is wrong even if the logic is comforting. It is the system and its fragility, not events, that must be studied—what physicists call “percolation theory,” in which the proper- ties of the terrain are studied rather than those of a single element of the terrain. When dealing with a system that is inherently unpredictable, what should be done? Diªerentiating between two types of countries is useful. In the ﬁrst, changes in government do not lead to meaningful diªerences in political outcomes (since political tensions are out in the open). In the second type, changes in govern- ment lead to both drastic and deeply unpredictable changes. Consider that Italy, with its much- maligned “cabinet instability,” is economi- cally and politically stable despite having had more than 60 governments since World War II (indeed, one may say Italy’s stability is because of these switches of government). Similarly, in spite of consis- tently bad press, Lebanon is a relatively safe bet in terms of how far governments can jump from equilibrium; in spite of all the noise, shifting alliances, and street protests, changes in government there tend to be comparatively mild. For exam- ple, a shift in the ruling coalition from Christian parties to Hezbollah is not such a consequential jump in terms of the country’s economic and political stability. Switching equilibrium, with control of the government changing from one party to another, in such systems acts as a shock absorber. Since a single party cannot have total and more than temporary control, the possibility of a large jump in the regime type is constrained. In contrast, consider Iran and Iraq. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and Sad- dam Hussein both constrained volatility by any means necessary. In Iran, when the shah was toppled, the shift of power to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini was a huge, unforeseeable jump. After the fact, analysts could construct convincing accounts about how killing Iranian Communists, driving the left into exile, demobilizing the demo- cratic opposition, and driving all dissent into the mosque had made Khomeini’s rise inevitable. In Iraq, the United States removed the lid and was actually surprised to ﬁnd that the regime did not jump from hyperconstraint to something like France. But this was impossible to predict ahead of time due to the nature of the system itself. What can be said, however, is that the more constrained the volatility, the bigger the regime jump is likely to be. From the French Revolution to the triumph of the Bolsheviks, history is replete with such examples, and yet somehow humans remain unable to process what they mean. THE FEAR OF RANDOMNESS Humans fear randomness—a healthy ancestral trait inherited from a diªerent environment. Whereas in the past, which was a more linear world, this trait enhanced ﬁtness and increased chances of survival, it can have the reverse eªect in today’s complex world, making volatility take the shape of nasty Black Swans hiding behind deceptive periods of “great moderation.” This is not to say that any and all volatility should be embraced. Insurance should not be banned, for example. But alongside the “catalysts as causes” confusion sit two mental biases: the illusion of control and the action bias (the illusion that doing something is always better than doing nothing). This leads to the desire to impose man-made solutions. Greenspan’s actions were harmful, but it would have been hard to justify inaction in a democracy where the incentive is to always promise a better outcome than the other guy, regard- less of the actual, delayed cost. Variation is information. When there is no variation, there is no information. This explains the cia’s failure to predict the Egyptian revolution and, a generation before, the Iranian Revolution—in both cases, the revolutionaries themselves did not have a clear idea of their relative strength with respect to the regime they were hoping to topple. So rather than sub- sidize and praise as a “force for stability” every tin-pot potentate on the planet, the U.S. government should encourage countries to let information ﬂow upward through the transparency that comes with political agitation. It should not fear ﬂuc- tuations per se, since allowing them to be in the open, as Italy and Lebanon both show in diªerent ways, creates the stability of small jumps. As Seneca wrote in De clementia, “Repeated punishment, while it crushes the hatred of a few, stirs the hatred of all . . . just as trees that have been trimmed throw out again countless branches.” The imposition of peace through repeated punishment lies at the heart of many seemingly intractable conﬂicts, including the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate. Further- more, dealing with seemingly reliable high-level officials rather than the people themselves prevents any peace treaty signed from being robust. The Romans were wise enough to know that only a free man under Roman law could be trusted to engage in a contract; by extension, only a free people can be trusted to abide by a treaty. Treaties that are negotiated with the consent of a broad swath of the populations on both sides of a conﬂict tend to survive. Just as no central bank is powerful enough to dictate stability, no superpower can be powerful enough to guarantee solid peace alone. U.S. policy toward the Middle East has historically, and especially since 9/11, been unduly focused on the repression of any and all political ﬂuctuations in the name of preventing “Islamic fundamentalism”— a trope that Mubarak repeated until his last moments in power and that Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddaﬁ continues to emphasize today, blaming Osama bin Laden for what has befallen him. This is wrong. The West and its autocratic Arab allies have strengthened Islamic funda- mentalists by forcing them underground, and even more so by killing them. As Jean-Jacques Rousseau put it, “A little bit of agitation gives motivation to the soul, and what really makes the species prosper is not peace so much as freedom.” With freedom comes some unpredictable ﬂuctuation. This is one of life’s packages: there is no freedom without noise—and no stability without volatility.∂

#### Neg scenarios are epistemologically flawed – trapped at the level preemptable actualizable fears – makes their scenarios non-falsifiable and non-empirical - locks in the current psychle of preemptive warfare as self-fulfilling prophecy

**Massumi 07** (Brian, professor of Philosophy at European Graduate School, “Potential Politics and the Primacy of Pre-Emption” Retrieved 10/15/13 R.C.)

17.This co-productive logic is well illustrated in the policies and statements of the Bush administration, and explains why Bush has never admitted that the War in Iraq has been a failure even as he is coming to accept that it isn't exactly avictory yet and that "tactical changes" are now necessary. Consider this statement from June 19, 2005: "Some may agreewith my decision to remove Saddam Hussein from power, but allof us can agree that the world's terrorists have now made Iraq a central front in the war on terror." This was Bush's way of admitting that there were no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Objectively, his reasons for invading were false. But threat in today's world is not objective. It is potential. Potential threat calls for a potential politics. As Bush and many members of his administration have repeatedy argued, Saddam Hussein could have had weapons of mass destruction and that if he had had them, he would have used them. Could have, would have, if: the potential nature of the threat requires a conditional logic. A conditional statement cannot be wrong. First because it only asserts a potential, and second because, especially in the case of something so slippery as a potential, you can't prove the negative. Even if it wasn't actually there, it will always still have been there potentially: Saddam could have restarted his weapons projects at any moment. When you act on "could haves" and"would haves" you are right by definition as long as your reasons for acting are not objective. It is simply a category error to give empirical reasons for § Marked 11:39 § your actions with respect to potential politics. This is what the Bush administration insiders meant when they ridiculed "the reality-based community" as being hopelessly behind the times. Nowadays, your action is right by definition as long as you go politically conditional, and have a good reason for doing so.18.Fear is always a good reason to go politically conditional. Fear is the palpable action in the present of a threatening future cause. It acts just as palpably whether the threat is determinate or not. It weakens your resolve, createsstress, lowers consumer confidence, and may ultimately lead to individual and/or economic paralysis. To avoid the paralysis, which would make yourself even more of a target and carry the fear to even higher level, you must simply act. In Bush administration parlance, you "go kinetic."6 You leap into action on a level with the potential that frightens you. You do that, once again, by inciting the potential to take an actual shape you can respond to. You trigger a production of what you fear. You turn the objectively indeterminate cause into an actual effect so you can actually deal with it in some way. Any time you feel the need to act, then all you have to do is actuate a fear. The production of the effect follows as smoothly as a reflex. This affective dynamicis still very much in place, independent of Rumsfeld's individual fate. It will remain in place as long as fear and remains politicallyactuatable.

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#### No immigration reform – House-Senate compromise unlikely, path to citizenship prevents agreement

Rojas 13 (Leslie Berestein Rojas, Immigration and Emerging Communities Reporter, “Immigration issues to watch in 2014,” 12-30-13,

<http://www.scpr.org/blogs/multiamerican/2013/12/30/15492/immigration-top-stories-to-watch-in-2014/>)

A year ago, advocates, politicos and pundits were speculating as to whether 2013 would be the year that the political winds finally favored a major immigration overhaul, the first since 1986. Republicans were smarting from the losses they took in the November 2012 election, with Latino and Asian voters stepping up in record numbers to hand a re-election victory to President Obama. But some veteran immigration watchers who had been down this path in 2006 and 2007 weren't so sure - and they were right. While the Senate passed a sweeping bill in June, which included a path to U.S. citizenship for unauthorized immigrants, House Republicans simply couldn't get behind it. Plans for a bipartisan House bill crumbled. The Senate plan stalled in the House and the rest is, well, recent political history. Fast-forward to the end of the year: Republican House Speaker John Boehner has dropped hints that he'll push the House on immigration reform in 2014. But what the House votes on might look quite different from what Senate supporters of a comprehensive reform plan envisioned. "We're likely to see bills that deal with specific components, like the Dream Act, high-skilled visas, and probably a bill that passes the House, or is at least proposed in the House, that would propose legalization for undocumented immigrants without a pathway to citizenship," said Karthick Ramakrishnan, a UC Riverside political scientist who studies immigration. This could even make for strange bedfellows, political observers say, as advocates push for a halt to deportations and Republicans float legal status without a path to citizenship. But compromises will most likely only go so far. President Obama and other immigration reform supporters have said they're willing to consider the piecemeal approach that House Republicans favor. But only if these piecemeal bills address key provisions of the Senate bill - and a path to U.S. citizenship is the key provision of the Senate bill. Without it, it's hard to count on much Senate support. As for the political winds, if the timing wasn't right for a broader proposal to succeed in 2013, when might it be? The short answer: 2014. But it's an election year, so don't hold your breath. There will also be other high-priority distractions in the coming year, like a debt ceiling redux. Where does this leave any kind of significant immigration legislation? "There's a small possibility after the election, in the lame duck session," said Louis DeSipio, a political scientist and immigration expert at UC Irvine. "But I would only expect action if Republicans lose more than they did in 2012, and that does not seem to be a likely outcome." On that note, the Republican Party has been making a concerted effort to reach to Latino voters in the wake of 2012. But the truth is that many House GOP members are secure in their districts without these voters, at least so far. Which means that it may take a little longer for a major immigration overhaul to go the distance.

#### Benign imperialism – faith in multilateralism prevents questioning imperial domination

**Shaikh 7** (Nermeen, Asia Source, “Interrogating Charity and the Benevolence of Empire”, Development, 50, Palgrave Journals)

And where, again, does this power for benevolent goodwill reside? In the post-war period, and especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, it is the United States that sees itself increasingly as the vanguard of human emancipation, John Winthrop's 'city upon a hill'. This is also its rightful place, having emerged from a unique tradition (political, social, cultural and religious), which has brought it to its current position of freedom and leadership. And so it is the US, sometimes in the guise of multilateralism, most recently not as much, that exercises the **most power globally**. The liberal, democratic-capitalist political system is triumphant. How, then, does one interrogate American intervention in the world according to its own standards? How does one hold the US accountable precisely for the goodwill it professes? Can the US hold itself accountable in any meaningful sense? Collateral damage One clue as to the possibility of such an auto-critique lies in a phrase that has become part of the popular political imaginary: collateral damage. This term, inaugurated during the Cold War, is perhaps the euphemism par excellence: it contains within it the **cleansing**, indeed the impossibility, **of culpability;** it must be assumed that the US is always acting with good intentions, and if events unfold in such a way as to suggest otherwise, then each instance is simply a betrayal of the original intent, which is itself beyond reproach – or at the very least, **absolved of the worst offences**. In certain readings, the various forms of oppression and exclusion that make up the collateral damage of imperial power might also be interpreted as **constitutive of the order** in which they occur. In the economic realm, Joseph Stiglitz, for instance, argues that the West has used its disproportionate share of economic power to maintain its position, most notably when it comes to determining the terms of trade as well as the limits of free trade (an essential ingredient of the present liberal-capitalist dispensation) (Stiglitz, 2002). This often, and perhaps unsurprisingly, results in a distinct advantage for richer countries. In other readings, intentions may be harder to determine, but given that the term collateral damage includes within it the possibility of its own exoneration, what can be said about the likelihood of justice in such a system? If every inequality, every abuse, every infraction is seen as an aberration, as a demonstration of the fact that the order **has not yet reached its full potential,** § Marked 11:40 § are we to hope that this same order will eventually be equal to its own avowed aspirations? The response to the latter question is of course widely affirmative. The problem is that it is predicated on the claims of the dispensers of benevolent intervention themselves. But it is necessary to interrogate these very claims to bring out the more **egregious and systematic forms of collateral damage** and thereby question the very possibility of justice within this order. On the one hand, as Stiglitz also points out, there is some hope: whereas previously only the radical left was critical of the World Bank and IMF, now these critiques are far more widespread. On the other hand, the possibility of a global, socialist revolution is scarcely found anywhere. Attempting to speak from the perspective of the recipients of goodwill immediately, then, begs the question: is radical structural change necessary before the possibility of justice in the realm of collateral damage can be born?

### Kritik

#### History proves capitalism isn’t the root of conflict

McKenzie 3 (D. W., Graduate Student in Economics – George Mason University, “Does Capitalism Require War?”, http://www.mises.org/story/1201)

Perhaps the oddest aspect of these various, but similar, claims is that their proponents appeal so often to historical examples. They often claim that history shows how capitalism is imperialistic and warlike or at least benefits from war. Capitalism supposedly needs a boost from some war spending from time to time, and history shows this. Robert Higgs demonstrated that the wartime prosperity during the Second World War was illusory.. This should come to no surprise to those who lived through the deprivations of wartime rationing. We do not need wars for prosperity, but does capitalism breed war and imperialism anyway? History is rife with examples of imperialism. The Romans, Alexander, and many others of the ancient world waged imperialistic wars. The Incan Empire and the empire of Ancient China stand as examples of the universal character of imperialism. Who could possibly claim that imperialism grew out of the prosperity of these ancient civilizations? Imperialism precedes modern industrial capitalism by many centuries. Uneven wealth distribution or underconsumption under capitalism obviously did not cause these instances of imperialism. Of course, this fact does not prove that modern capitalism lacks its own imperialistic tendencies The notion that income gets underspent or maldistributed lies at the heart of most claims that capitalism either needs or produces imperialistic wars. As J.B. Say argued, supply creates its own demand through payments to factors of production. Demand Side economists Hobson and Keynes argued that there would be too little consumption and too little investment for continuous full employment. We save too much to have peace and prosperity. The difficulty we face is not in oversaving, but in underestimating the workings of markets and the desires of consumers. Doomsayers have been downplaying consumer demand for ages. As demand side economist J.K. Galbraith claimed, we live in an affluent society, where most private demands have been met. Of course, Hobson made the same claim much earlier. Earlier and stranger still, mercantilists claimed that 'wasteful acts' such as tea drinking, gathering at alehouses, taking snuff, and the wearing of ribbons were unnecessary luxuries that detracted from productive endeavors. The prognostications of esteemed opponents of capitalism have consistently failed to predict consumer demand. Today, consumers consume at levels that few long ago could have imagined possible. There is no reason to doubt that consumers will continue to press for ever higher levels of consumption. Though it is only a movie, Brewster's Millions illustrates how creative people can be at spending money. People who do actually inherit, win, or earn large sums of money have little trouble spending it. Indeed, wealthy individuals usually have more trouble holding on to their fortunes than in finding ways to spend them. We are never going to run out of ways to spend money. Many of the complaints about capitalism center on how people save too much. One should remember that there really is no such thing as saving. Consumers defer consumption to the future only. As economist Eugen Böhm-Bawerk demonstrated, people save according to time preference. Savings diverts resources into capital formation. This increases future production. Interest enhanced savings then can purchase these goods as some consumers cease to defer their consumption. Keynes' claim that animal spirits drive investment has no rational basis. Consumer preferences are the basis for investment. Investors forecast future consumer demand. Interest rates convey knowledge of these demands. The intertemporal coordination of production through capital markets and interest rates is not a simple matter. But Keynes' marginal propensities to save and Hobson's concentration of wealth arguments fail to account for the real determinants of production through time.…. Capitalism neither requires nor promotes imperialist expansion. Capitalism did not create imperialism or warfare. Warlike societies predate societies with secure private property. The idea that inequity or underspending give rise to militarism lacks any rational basis. Imperialistic tendencies exist due to ethnic and nationalistic bigotries, and the want for power. Prosperity depends upon our ability to prevent destructive acts. The dogma of destructive creation fails as a silver lining to the cloud of warfare. Destructive acts entail real costs that diminish available opportunities. The idea that we need to find work for idle hands in capitalism at best leads to a kind of Sisyphus economy where unproductive industries garner subsidies from productive people. At worst, it serves as a supporting argument for war. The more recent versions of the false charges against capitalism do nothing to invalidate two simple facts. Capitalism generates prosperity by creating new products. War inflicts poverty by destroying existing wealth. There is no sound reason to think otherwise.

#### We are resistance within the system – our lauritsen evidence indicates that we can challenge democratic deficits by agititating for principles of democracy – doesn’t mean we have to unproblematically affirm the state or capitalism – you should support all forms of resistance as positive steps in the right direction

Robinson and Tormey 6 (Andrew, Leverhulme Trust Early Career Fellow in the School of Politics – University of Nottingham and Simon, Professor of Politics and Critical Theory and Head of the School of Politics – University of Nottingham, “Zizek’s Marx: ‘Sublime Object’ or a ‘Plague of Fantasies’?”, Historical Materialism, 14(3))

Thinking, fourthly, about the formal characteristics of revolutionary action, Marx is never dismissive (as Zizek is) of resistance, no matter how ‘petty’ or poorly co-ordinated. Marx, that is, does not prejudge the adequacy or effectiveness of political action from the standpoint of an abstract model of praxis (the Act), which is then used to dismiss or endorse the efforts of those resisting. Thus, ‘the Communists do not set up sectarian principles of their own, by which to shape and mould the proletarian movement’.126 This means that they are prepared to act in whatever way to advance the interests of the working class and any other social forces who are acting in a revolutionary way.127 Even utopians, about whom Marx can be dismissive, offer something more than a mere ‘supplement’ of capitalism. Indeed, as he notes in the Manifesto, utopias are ‘full of the most valuable materials for the enlightenment of the working class’.128 For Marx, therefore, resistances that stop short of revolution, and even seem purely ‘phantasmatic’, are, **although inadequate, a step forward** **that should be supported by all means**.

#### Subpoint a - Solves better – using capitalism to fight itself is more effective

Rothkrug 90 (Paul, Founder – Environmental Rescue Fund, Monthly Review, March, 41(10), p. 38)

No institution is or ever has been a seamless monolith. Although the inherent mechanism of American capitalism is as you describe it, oriented solely to profit without regard to social consequences, this does not preclude significant portions of that very system from joining forces with the worldwide effort for the salvation of civilization, perhaps even to the extent of furnishing the margin of success for that very effort.

#### Subpoint b that breaks down absolutist divisions and checks violence

Levin 98 (Richard, President – Yale, “"Activist Politics" and/or the Job Crisis in the Humanities”, The Minnesota Review, 48/49, http://www.theminnesotareview.org/journal/ns48/levin.htm)

As a result of this view of the world, many people on the far right and far left are single-causers; they believe not only that everything the demon does has bad effects in our society, but also that everything bad in our society is caused by this demon. Right-wing extremists hold feminism or secular humanism or ZOG responsible for drugs, crime, floridation, and the decline of "family values," and many leftists—including some appearing in mr—claim that capitalism is the cause of racism and sexism (Cotter 119-21, Lewis 97-98, Young 288-91). This, in turn, leads to the belief that there's a single cure, and only this one cure, for all these social ills: the complete extirpation of the demon that causes them and the complete transformation of society. Thus extremists on both sides tend to be all-or-nothingists, to reject all reforms as "band-aids" that are doomed to fail since they don't get at the source of our problems and so won't further this radical transformation (Neilson/Meyerson 45: 268-69). Many are also millenarians who believe the transformation will be brought about by an apocalyptic clash between the forces of good and evil ending in the permanent defeat of the demon and the creation of a utopia(for fundamentalists this is a literal Armageddon and Second Coming, for militias it's RaHoWa (Racial Holy War) or the uprising of true patriots against our traitorous government foretold in The Turner Diaries with its Hitlerian "final solution," and for Marxists it's the proletarian revolution that, their anthem tells us, will be "the final conflict." Another consequence of their polarization is that partisans at both extremes try to eliminate the intermediate positions between them, often by denying their differences. Neilson and Meyerson say that "we should see liberalism and conservatism as flipsides" (45: 269) and argue that Republicans and Democrats are really the same (47: 242), as does Tom Lewis at greater length (89-90). Similarly, George Wallace, in his racist, third-party campaign, insisted that "there isn't a dime's worth of difference between them." More sinister is their tendency to **"disappear"** these intermediate positions by equating them with the opposite extreme. McCarthy and his followers attacked Democrats and even liberal Republicans as "pinkos" and "fellow travelers," and Marxist regimes condemned social democrats and even communists who deviated from the party line as fascist counterrevolutionaries who **must be liquidated**. Some extremists on the academic left employ this tactic against moderates and liberals, although with less lethal results. The same Marxist critic who called me a "self-confessed liberal" also called me, in another essay published in the same year, a "reactionary" ("Terminator" 64), and Donald Morton and Mas'ud Zavarzadeh consign Gerald Graff, Stanley Fish, Richard Rorty, and Andrew Ross to the same camp as Rush Limbaugh (32-33). (Neilson and Meyerson's attack on Bérubé is more restrained--the worst thing they call him is a "liberal pluralist" [45: 267, 47: 239, 245]; but they try to connect him, as I noted, to support of the far right in Central America.) Such people need a simplistic division of the political world into two polar opposites with no awkward alternatives (just as they need a simplistic explanation of the cause and cure of all our problems), because they can't tolerate complexity or uncertainty. That mental set, I believe, is the most significant similarity (or "equivalence") between the far right and far left.

#### Aff catalyzes a broader movement against militarism and violence by bringing attention to the other that’s butler and understanding the way that all of us are complicit in war – that’s Cuomo - We are universal call to action, and class-based politics are equally prone to cooption

Laclau 00 (Ernesto, Professor of Comparative Literature – University of Buffalo, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, p. 292)

(i) Zizek thinks that the degree of globality or universality of a struggle depends on its location in the social structure: some struggles conceived as ‘class struggle’ – those of the workers, especially – would spontaneously and tendentially be more ‘universal’ in their effects because they take place at the ‘root’ of the capitalist system; while others, more ‘cultural’ in their aims – such as multicultural ones – would be more prone to particularism and, as a result, easier to integrate into the present system of domination. For me, **this is a spurious distinction**. There is no struggle which has inscribed in itself the guarantee of being the privilege locus of universalistic political effects. Workers’ demands – higher wages, shorter working hours, better conditions in the workplaces, and so on – can, given the appropriate circumstances, be as easily integrated into the system as those of any other group. Conversely, given the globalization of capitalism, dislocations could take place which are at the basis of anti-systemic movements led by groups who are not directly part of capitalist relations of production. So while for Zizek the distinction between ‘class struggle’ and what he calls ‘postmodernism’ is fundamental, I tend to blur it.

## 1ar

#### And they’ll say that capitalism is worse than ableism – this is not a measuring contest – projects to combat classism historically rely on metaphors of visibility

**Valdes and Culp 02** (Francisco, Professor of Law, Duke University, Durham, and Jerome, teacher, social activist, and lawyer, is pursuing a doctoral degree at Columbia University Law School, “Crossroads, directions, and a new critical race theory”, GAL)

**As with racism, sexism, classism**, and homophobia, **we** began increasingly to **notice how our everyday experiences are rife with examples of ableism**. In particular, we started noting with more critical awareness the recurrent, and often inadvertent, exam­ples of ableism in the very language of crit­ical discourse: **Think of "the ways in which the terms 'visible' and 'invisible' are used as metaphors** in much outsider cuJture and jurisprudence]. Notice how **these metaphors privilege *seeing****.* [**Notice, too, the' metaphors of'voice' and 'silence**.' "l9 **The critique of dis­ability** theorises thus **raises a broad range of matters pertinent to outsider jurisprudence as antisubordination method**; disability the­ories, from many different vantage poinrs, **enhance social-justice scholarship and prac­tice**. The addition of Disability Theory to the expanding universe of outsider scholarship has enriched both our work and our lives.